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his essay begins with the premise that Milton’s A Mask Presented at Ludlow 
Castle makes legible the central, if usually tacit, role that sexual practice plays 
in both early modern and modern definitions of what it means to be 
human. In particular, A Mask – along with the religious and philosophical 
traditions that inform it and the critical discussions that have surrounded it 
– demonstrates the extent to which normative definitions of sex are based on a 
biopolitical temporality that shapes ontological distinctions between human and 
animal behavior. Comus, in many readings, is perverted and bestial because he 
flouts both normal daily rhythms (decent people work during the day and go to 
bed early) and normative developmental trajectories (one becomes a grown up 
only when one marries and has children). What these daily and developmental 
norms have in common is an orientation of one’s sexual life toward future plans 
rather than present needs or pleasures. So one might say that what determines 
whether one is normal – or, to use the term most often employed by Milton and 
his critics, virtuous – is not only the gender of one’s object choice but also the 
extent to which one practices the sexual restraint that sustains what Jack (Judith) 
Halberstam describes as the “narrative coherence of adolescence-early adulthood-
marriage-reproduction-childrearing-retirement-death.”1 Such a chronology is a 
uniquely human aspiration. Indeed, Heidegger wondered whether the animal can 
be said to be “constituted by some kind of time” at all, given that it “merely has 
life,” not the being-toward-death, the sense of anticipation and potentiality that 
defines Dasein and therefore humanity.2 Read in the context of the philosophical 
and religious tradition that has shaped the outlook of both Milton and his modern 
critics, living in and for the present as Comus does, with its related choice of matter 
over spirit, this world over the next, becomes evidence not just of immaturity or 
perversion. In the estimation of the Lady and the Attendant Spirit, Comus’s carpe 
diem sexuality signifies a failure to be fully human and therefore a relinquishment 
of the rights and privileges to which human being is entitled.3  
The anxiety that sex transforms humans into beasts is, of course, central 
to the Circe myth on which A Mask is based. It is not only the Attendant Spirit, 
the Brothers, or the Lady who construe Comus’s offers of present pleasure as a 
bad thing. With a few exceptions, Milton’s readers have unanimously accepted the 
Spirit’s and the Lady’s evaluation of the pleasures, one might say the “lifestyle,” 
that Comus promotes and therefore have inadvertently endorsed an ideology 








such readings at length in order to demonstrate the pervasiveness of an idealization 
of chastity among critics with otherwise very different arguments and 
methodologies. In describing Comus’s association with Cotytto, William A. Oram 
suggests that, given classical and Renaissance associations of this goddess with 
transvestitism and licentiousness, the “befriending” that Comus asks of Cotytto 
“would seem to involve demonic possession which would result in a loss of 
rational control and a subsequent performance of goddess’s bestial ‘dues.’”5 
Stanley Fish describes sexual temperance as a “liberating action” in that it is “the 
sign of a refusal to be in bondage to natural processes and a declaration of 
dependence on a power that controls, and can at any time suspend, them.”6 
Victoria Silver praises chastity as “a loving and reverent inflection towards the 
world and the body, the domains in which God, the soul, and their particular joy 
are made known.”7 Similarly, William Shullenberger applauds the Lady because 
she “effectively critiques and repudiates the pleasure package Comus has to offer, 
because she is able to envision and articulate a more compelling and 
comprehensive alternative,” one of “mature womanhood” based on “the 
possibilities of a higher order of pleasure which chastity offers.”8 Feminist readings 
of A Mask have argued that chastity can liberate women not only from the 
excesses of libidinal drives, but also from the patriarchal constraints that chastity 
notionally sustains, and they have thereby implicitly sanctioned a normative 
suspicion that sex is innately dangerous and degrading.9 Richard Halpern, for 
instance, notes that presence in A Mask of maenads, Amazons, and nymphs of 
Diana “mark the point at which virginity ceases to denote submission and begins 
to denote revolt.”10 John Rogers argues that the Lady offers an image of “self-
sufficient femininity” that “functions to reconfigure the authoritarian dynamics of 
power in the world at large.”11 Kathryn Schwarz sees chastity as a compromised 
by nonetheless significant form of female agency that “might expose coercive 
normativity to its own double edge.”12 
The point I want to make about such readings is not that they are 
inaccurate. To be sure, A Mask represents chastity much as these readers say it 
does. My observation, instead, is rather simple, even obvious. I want to point out 
that the idealization of chastity in A Mask, along with the philosophical and 
theological traditions from which it emerges, promotes heteronormativity insofar 
as it privileges certain sexual behaviors (those that are restrained, loving, 
monogamous, and procreative) over others (those that are uninhibited, 
anonymous, promiscuous, and nonprocreative). In reading A Mask through the 
framework of queer theory instead, we can appreciate how definitions of the 
human – along with the rights and privileges that we accord those who fit into that 
category and deny those who do not – are informed by what Elizabeth Freeman 
has called “chronopolitics,” the shaping of biopolitical status through temporal 
mechanisms that determine which human experiences “officially count as a life or 
one of its parts.”13 In 1633, Milton acknowledged his own uneasy relationship to 
a normative timeline when he wrote a friend to contrast his desires for scholarly 
fame, which might require continued retirement from the world, with the “potent 
inclination in bred wch about this tyme of a mans life sollicits most, the desire of 






early entring into credible employment, & nothing more hindering then this 
affected solitarinesse.”14 However much Milton may recognize “house & family” 
as what one should want at “this tyme of a mans life,” his own inclination toward 
“solitarinesse” throws such normative logic into question.  
Given that Milton wrote this letter so close to the composition of A Mask, 
we can understand this work as a meditation on the question of what constitutes 
normal and proper sexuality. Indeed, Shullenberger has rightly read A Mask as 
depicting the initiation of the Lady into sexual maturity.15 Whereas Shullenberger, 
like most of Milton’s critics, leaves unexamined the ideal of chastity to which the 
masque directs the Lady, I want to look more closely at the implications of this 
ideal, as well as the contradictions inherent within it.16 For to queer Milton, as I 
understand it, is not just to look for his depictions of same-sex desire, though that 
is undoubtedly an important part of such a project. To queer Milton is also to 
examine his complex engagement with a heteronormative assumption that sex is 
most virtuous – indeed, most human – when it occurs between adults in a 
monogamous, loving, long-term, procreative relationship.  
A queer reading of Milton, more specifically, helps us to challenge ideals 
of proper sexuality – and particularly what Michael Warner has called “the politics 
of sexual shame” – in the same way that feminist theory has helped us to question 
the gendered norms and hierarchies that Milton at times endorses.17 As Warner 
has observed, “Perhaps because sex is an occasion for losing control, for merging 
one’s consciousness with the lower orders of animal desire and sensation, for raw 
confrontations of power and demand, it fills people with aversion and shame.” A 
queer ethics emerges not when we deny the shame of sex by insisting that it is 
entirely innocent and natural, “pleasurable and life-affirming.”18 Rather, “in those 
circles were queerness has been most cultivated, the ground rule is that one doesn’t 
pretend to be above the indignity of sex. . . . A relation to others, in these contexts, 
begins in an acknowledgment of all that is most abject and least reputable in 
oneself.”19 We might compare Silver’s assurance that “the Lady’s predicament 
represents a way of dignifying human being without trying to escape it” with 
Warner’s certainty that “If sex is a kind of indignity, then we’re all in it together.”20 
An awareness of the contrast between what we might call a reflexively normative 
ethics of sex and a consciously queer one allows us to question what Laurie 
Shannon calls “human exceptionalism,” the notion that humanity is bounded off 
from all other creatures by virtue of our ability to rationalize and regulate our 
bodily functions.21 For while A Mask certainly promotes a normative ethics of sex, 
it also shows that such an ethics cannot be sustained by the rationality that 
ostensibly separates human from beast. A normative sexual ethics, rather, rests on 
an appeal to a higher power that exceeds human reason and thereby exposes not 
only the limits of such reason but also the violence necessary to sustain a liberal 
humanist ideal of personhood and politics.  
In A Mask, Comus makes visible an alternative way of being in the world, 
one that follows from reflection on what it means to embrace the dark and 
disturbing aspects of sexuality and one that the Spirit and the Lady cannot fully 
defeat or resist. I am not suggesting that Milton himself endorsed expressions of 







he would side with the Spirit and the Lady. But A Mask also acknowledges that 
chaste deferral may be no more rational than promiscuous indulgence – for the 
ultimate defense of the former depends not on reason but on a network of faith 
and violence that cannot be fully squared with the logic that ostensibly separates 
the human cogito from the bête- machine.22  
The association of what Lee Edelman has called “reproductive 
futurism”23 with humanity as such has a long history in Christian and Neoplatonic 
thought. A central figure in this history is St. Augustine, who locates the distinction 
between humans and beasts in the human ability to reflect on, theorize, and make 
value judgments about the sense perceptions that we share with animals. Whereas 
“the life of the lower animals consists entirely in the pursuit of physical pleasures 
and the avoidance of pains,” to be human is to look to a future when the body’s 
needs will be left behind: “we repair the daily wastage of our bodies by eating and 
drinking, until the time comes when you will bring both food and our animal nature to 
an end [1 Cor. 6.13] . . . But for the present I find pleasure in this need, though I 
fight against it, for fear of becoming its captive.”24 The truly happy life is always 
in the future, for “even the righteous man himself will not live the life he wishes 
unless he reaches that state where he is wholly exempt from death, deception, and 
distress, and has the assurance that he will for ever be exempt. This is what our 
nature craves, and it will never be fully and finally happy unless it attains what it 
craves.”25  
For the Neoplatonist philosophers whose influence permeates A Mask, 
this aspiration was a result of humanity’s mixed nature.26 In Pico’s version of the 
creation myth, God made humanity “a creature of indeterminate nature” and 
instructed the first human that “thou mayest fashion thyself in whatever shape 
thou shalt prefer. Thou shalt have the power to degenerate into the lower forms 
of life, which are brutish. Thou shalt have the power, out of thy soul’s judgment, 
to be reborn into the higher forms, which are divine.” The Protestant Reformers 
were less optimistic about humanity’s power to transcend what Ficino had called 
“the beast in us.”27 Accordingly, Luther and Calvin recommended marriage as the 
best way to redeem animal desires. As Luther allows, “in point of physical life 
there is no difference or very little difference between us and the animals . . . the 
only difference is that they have no reason.”28 For Luther, the thing that redeems 
the sexual impulse is the ability to contain it within procreative marriage:  
this word which God speaks, “Be fruitful and multiply,” is 
not a command. It is more than a command, namely, a 
divine ordinance [werck] which it is not our prerogative to 
hinder or ignore. Rather, it is just as necessary as the fact 
that I am a man, and more necessary than sleeping and 
waking, eating and drinking, and emptying the bowels and 
bladder. It is a nature and disposition just as innate as the 
organs involved in it. Therefore, just as God does not 
command anyone to be a man or a woman but creates them 
the way they have to be, so he does not command them to 






whenever men try to resist this, it remains irreversible 
nonetheless and goes its way through fornication, adultery, 
and secret sins, for this is a matter of nature and not of 
choice.29  
 
The only proper way to give into the “nature and disposition” with which God 
has endowed humanity is to “multiply” oneself within the confines of marriage. 
But even married sex must not be too sexy. In the conjugal bed, Luther warns, “a 
man has to control himself and not make a filthy sow’s sty of his marriage.”30 The 
sexual impulse is naturally to “multiply,” not to find pleasure. To enjoy the work 
of procreation too much is to degenerate into a beast.  
The Attendant Spirit’s prologue and epilogue situate A Mask within a 
tradition that equates a futurist orientation with virtue and value, a presentist one 
with perversity and emptiness. He would therefore seem to epitomize the vulgar 
Platonism that Silver has critiqued as a mode of thought characterized by “the 
desire to escape mortality by transcending the embodied condition of our 
humanity and all those discomfiting circumstances that go with it.”31 Yet even as 
he longs for transcendence, the Spirit acknowledges its impossibility.32 In the 
prologue, the Spirit appears incapable of disengaging himself from the earth; in 
the epilogue, he imagines a heaven defined by the distinctly worldly activities of 
marriage and procreation. The first sentence of A Mask oscillates between heaven 
and earth and aligns them with a series of oppositions – human and animal, future 
and present, eternity and immediacy – that will concern the work as a whole:  
Before the starry threshold of Jove’s Court 
My mansion is, where those immortal shapes 
Of bright aerial Spirits live inspher’d 
In Regions mild of calm and serene Air, 
Above the smoke and stir of this dim spot, 
Which men call Earth, and with low-thoughted care  
Confin’d and pester’d in this pinfold here, 
Strive to keep up a frail and feverish being,  
Unmindful of the crown that Virtue gives 
After this mortal change, to her true Servants  
Amongst the enthron’d gods on Sainted seats. 
Yet some there be that by due steps aspire 
To lay their just hands on that Golden Key 
That opes the Palace of Eternity: 
To such my errand is, and but for such, 
I would not soil these pure Ambrosial weeds 
With the rank vapors of this Sin-worn mold. (1-17)  
 
The Spirit presents a grammatically complete sentence within the first line and a 
half, one that, despite its inverted syntax, contains a clear piece of information: 
“Before the starry threshold of Jove’s Court / My mansion is.” But then he 







actually describe Jove’s Court, their grammatical object. Notably, the Spirit is more 
interested in denigrating “this dim spot, / Which men call earth” than he is in 
celebrating “Regions mild of calm and serene Air”: 7 out of 11 lines are about 
earth. However much the Spirit tries to escape the “pinfold” of earth, we might 
say that he himself remains “Confin’d and pester’d” there, revealing that it is not 
just the body but also the mind that is held captive by the “Sin-worn mold” that 
is at once the earth, the dirt that covers it, and the humanity that will gradually 
decay into the dust of which it was first formed. As in Augustine’s analysis, the 
truly virtuous human strives not to sustain life, but to prepare for its end, when 
we will finally be “wholly exempt from death, deception, and distress.” The 
temporal and spatial dimensions of the Spirit’s speech thus come together: it is 
only “After this mortal change” that we can reach the serene place “Before Jove’s 
Court” and “Above the smoke and stir of this dim spot.” 33  
So what is it actually like at the “starry threshold of Jove’s Court,” the 
“Palace of Eternity”? To find out, we have to wait until the Spirit’s epilogue. Here, 
we first learn that even the pleasures of the “Gardens fair / Of Hesperus” are 
inferior and temporary (981-982). The Spirit’s description of “The Graces,” “the 
rosy-bosomed Hours,” and “Iris . . . with humid bow” frolicking in the flowers 
becomes more disturbing than delightful when these “Beds of hyacinth, and 
roses” are revealed as the place “Where young Adonis oft reposes, / Waxing well 
of his deep wound / In slumber soft” (986, 992, 998, 999). These “Gardens fair” 
are also the site of injury, death, and mourning insofar as they contain Venus and 
Adonis, whose adulterous relationship is ultimately located “on the ground” where 
Venus “Sadly sits” – mired, we can assume, in the “rank vapors of this Sin-worn 
mold” (1001, 1002). What initially seemed a description of fanciful delight and 
liberation from earthly care ends up only another version of the pinfold the Spirit 
disdains. The consolation is that there is a better world “far above in spangled 
sheen,” one defined by marriage and procreation:  
Celestial Cupid her fam’d son advanc’t,  
Holds his dear Psyche sweet entranc’t  
After her wand’ring labors long, 
’Till free consent the gods among  
Make her his eternal Bride,  
And from her fair unspotted side  
Two blissful twins are to be born,  
Youth and Joy; so Jove hath sworn.  
 
Cupid and Psyche were allegories for Christ and the Soul in Neoplatonic 
philosophy, and their relationship was understood in conjugal terms.34 This 
“eternal” union, the Spirit tells us, is possible only “After [Psyche’s] wand’ring 
labors long,” and the tense shifts of this epilogue paradoxically imagine such 
fruitful union as both accomplished and uncertain. Cupid “holds” Psyche in a 
present that has come “After” her labors, but the rest of the sentence is in the 
future conditional: this will not happen “’Till free consent the gods among / Make 






Like other of Milton’s poems concerned with the gap between human time and 
divine eschatology, A Mask registers that gap in tense shifts: from a divine 
perspective of the nunc stans, this family has already been formed, even if from a 
human perspective its arrival must remain a matter of faith.  
Such slippage from present to future makes legible the extent to which 
idealizations of chaste love pattern the heaven of the future on present, worldly 
institutions of marriage and procreation.35 These institutions then proleptically 
acquire value and coercive force as a result of the future that they signify. Edelman 
has described the logic of reproductive futurism as one in which “all sensory 
experience, all pleasure of the flesh, must be borne away from this fantasy of 
futurity secured, eternity’s plan fulfilled . . . . Paradoxically, the child of the two-
parent family thus proves that its parents don’t fuck and on its tiny shoulders it 
carries the burden of maintaining the fantasy of a time to come in which meaning, 
at last made present to itself, no longer depends on the fantasy of its attainment in 
time to come.”36 If we agree with John Leonard that “the Cupid and Psyche lines 
stand among the healthiest passages in Milton,” we confuse vehicle and tenor and 
thereby identify the profoundly human constructs of marriage and reproduction 
with the divine order that ostensibly sanctions them.  
But the corresponding escape from the irreducibly bestial and perverse 
aspects of all sex – whether within or outside marriage, monogamy, and romance 
– is ultimately unachievable, as the Spirit’s depiction of Comus’s temptations 
inadvertently admits. As we have seen, Augustine and Luther both recognized that 
however much bodily needs may be channeled into social institutions, these needs 
cannot be denied and therefore provide an insistent reminder of our animal nature. 
Indeed, as Laurie Shannon has argued, until Descartes formalized the distinction 
between the cogito ergo sum, the thinking human, on the one hand, and the bête-
machine, the mechanical beast, on the other, there was no such thing as the blanket 
category of “the animal,” a term which hardly appears in English before the end 
of the sixteenth century, as humanity’s opposite. The operative model was instead 
Aristotle’s De Anima, which endowed all things with a soul and postulated a 
taxonomy in which each higher form of life incorporated all kinds of souls below 
it. According to this model, human beings were higher than non-human animals 
but still on a continuum with them.37 As the classical and early modern 
philosophical and theological traditions that I have sketched attest, distinctions 
between human and animal being had long been haunted by the possibility that 
the boundary could easily be crossed, that the human could degenerate into a beast 
(though beasts could never become human). For the Attendant Spirit, it is 
precisely this danger that Comus represents, for he  
Excels his Mother at her mighty Art, 
Off’ring to every weary Traveler 
His orient liquor in a Crystal Glass, 
To quench the drought of Phoebus, which as they taste,  
(For most do taste through fond intemperate thirst)  
Soon as the Potion works, their human count’nance,  







Into some brutish form of Wolf, or Bear,  
Or Ounce, or Tiger, Hog, or bearded Goat,  
All other parts remaining as they were.  
And they, so perfect is their misery, 
Not once perceive their foul disfigurement,  
But boast themselves more comely than before,  
And all their friends and native home forget,  
To roll with pleasure in a sensual sty. (63-77)  
 
Although the Spirit initially describes the travelers’ transformations as a result of 
Comus’s “mighty Art,” by the end of the passage it is clear that the travelers are 
more victims of their own somatic pressures than of Comus’s diabolical power. 
Comus certainly offers the drink of “orient liquor in a Crystal Glass,” but the 
travelers are “chang’d / Into some brutish form” as a result of their decision to 
“quench the drought of Phoebus.” As Stephen Orgel has pointed out, it doesn’t 
seem so bad to drink when one is thirsty: these people are “weary,” after all, and 
parched by the heat of the sun.38 Is thirst always “fond” and “intemperate,” then, 
simply because it is a bodily need? In the Spirit’s account, the answer would seem 
to be “yes.” Even worse, the travelers are unable to tell what has really happened 
to them, misapprehending their “foul disfigurement” – their loss of human form 
– as a change that has made them “more comely than before.” “Perfect misery” 
means a wretchedness or abjection so complete that it can no longer be perceived. 
What the travelers have lost is the Augustinian ability to find animal life 
unsatisfying and therefore to abandon the human circle of “friends and native 
home” in favor of a “sensual sty.” As the Elder Brother will later concur, lust is 
its own punishment. By giving into the impulses of the body, one becomes 
increasingly subject to those needs. If one indulges lust “By unchaste looks, loose 
gestures, and foul talk, / But most by lewd and lavish act of sin,” one loses the 
distinction between body and soul, as the soul “grows clotted by contagion, / 
Imbodies and imbrutes.” This is the state of the undead, the spirit that remains on 
earth even after the demise of the body, “loath to leave the body that it lov’d, / 
And link’t itself by carnal sensuality / To a degenerate and degraded state.” 
Unchaste sex becomes a form of necrophilia – a pleasure in bodies emptied of the 
spirit or mind that defines “life.”  
Comus offers an alternative theory of sexuality. But rather than claim a 
utopian or transcendent approach to pleasure, Comus acknowledges abject and 
shameful aspects of sex. The “ugly-headed monsters” with which he is surrounded 
make visible, as the Lady claims, the bestial dimension of the life he lives – a 
dimension he makes no effort to repress or sublimate. The difference between 
Comus’s approach, on the one hand, and the Lady’s and the Spirit’s, on the other, 
is not that the former is bestial and the latter human. The difference is that Comus 
admits the innate perversity of desire while the Lady and the Sprit believe that 
monogamous and procreative sex transcends the animal body with all its 
undignified drives and secretions. Comus’s own first lines reject both the 
reproductive futurism that the Spirit endorses and the diurnal rhythms of 






to blur distinctions and collapse boundaries: she is “ne’er . . . call’d but when the 
Dragon womb / Of Stygian darkness spits her thickest gloom, / And makes one 
blot of all the air” (128, 131-133).39 Imagining “thickest gloom” as the excretion 
of the “womb / Of Stygian darkness,” Comus evokes the threat of the abject as 
Julia Kristeva has described it. For Kristeva, abjection is “what disturbs identity, 
system, order. What does not respect borders, positions, rules. The in- between, 
the ambiguous, the composite.”40 Abjection, in Kristeva’s analysis, confronts us 
with the fragile states in which “man strays on the territory of the animal” and 
confronts “the hold of maternal entity before ex-isting outside of her.”41 Rejecting 
as it does moral and social limits, “Abjection then wavers between the fading away 
of all meaning and humanity . . . and the ecstasy of an ego that, having lost its Other 
and its objects, reaches, at the precise moment of this suicide, the height of 
harmony with the promised land.”42 This merging of human with earth – we might 
here recall the “Sin-worn mold” of the Spirit’s prologue or the decaying corpses 
of the Elder Brother’s speech – is at once terrifying and attractive. It signifies the 
same embrace of death that the Augustinian tradition of thought recommends, 
just without the transcendence.  
Yet Comus’s challenge to the boundaries on which subjectivity and 
society depend is as attractive as it is frightening.43 For when he offers an 
alternative temporality, Comus also reveals how artificial and fragile are the 
normative ideologies that the Spirit espouses:  
What hath night to do with sleep?  
Night hath better sweets to prove, 
Venus now wakes, and wak’ns Love. 
Come let us our rites begin, 
’Tis only daylight that makes Sin, 
Which these dun shades will ne’re report. (93-114, 122-127)  
 
In describing night as the time for pleasure rather than sleep, Comus rejects 
“normal” temporalities and boundaries as well as the values that adhere to them. 
The “Midnight shout and revelry / Tipsy dance and Jollity” that Comus describes 
is also a refusal of a normative ideal of maturity, the “Strict Age” that is marked 
by “Rigor,” “Advice,” “sour Severity” – and early bedtimes. We might think of 
Halberstam’s description of queer time as “the dark nightclub, the perverse turn 
away from the narrative coherence of adolescence-early adulthood-marriage- 
reproduction-childbearing-retirement-death, the embrace of late childhood in 
place of early adulthood or immaturity in place of responsibility.”44 Read in the 
context of queer critiques of chronopolitics, Comus’s rejection of Spirit’s 
teleological schema also signifies a rejection of the heteronormative ideology such 
a schema upholds and naturalizes. For Comus, the way to approach both death 
and divinity is to ignore the “grave Saws” and instead “Imitate the Starry Choir,” 
those heavenly bodies that are utterly indifferent to the human time that is based 
on their rotations. The “Months and Years” that measure out a life are merely a 
human interpretation of the heavens’ meaning, not the secure ascent to “the starry 







bodies and categories merge and the firm meanings that light might “report,” or 
put into discourse, fade from view. These are not objective or constant realities 
but discursive formations of a value system that that has been constructed by the 
human imagination, not the divine fiat that heteronormative ideals and institutions 
claim merely to obey and enforce.  
Comus similarly threatens the gendered and sexual orders on which the 
Spirit’s idealization of the procreative family depend. Comus, notoriously, is 
“Much like his Father, but his Mother more” (57), and critics have seen this 
ambiguity as evidence of his degraded state. Fish derides him as a hermaphroditic 
momma’s boy, while Louise Simons observes that Comus’s wielding of Circe’s 
cup and Bacchus’s wand, iconic images of the female and male genitalia, 
announces that he has no clearly dominant sexual identity.45 Ralph Singleton 
condemns Comus as “a gay sensualist and seducer.”46 Tracing representations of 
Comus’s sexual ambiguity to classical, biblical, and Renaissance sources, on the 
one hand, and the scandalous sodomy trial of the Earl of Castlehaven, on the 
other, Ross Leasure describes Comus as a “predator of ambiguous sexuality on 
the prowl in hopes of seducing the Lady and victimizing her brothers.”47  
The critical condemnation of both gender ambiguity and same-sex desire 
in A Mask allows us to see how the seemingly neutral ideal of chastity can shore 
up connections between normative narratives of temporal development, human 
ontology, and sexual desire and practice. Particularly insofar as all of the other 
characters can be read as what Ann Baynes Coiro calls “refractions” of Comus, 
we can see his challenge to gender boundaries as a challenge to normative sexual 
values more largely.48 Whereas Coiro deems A Mask “startlingly feminist,” 
however, I would argue that the Spirit’s and the Lady’s denigration of sexuality 
must also be understood as denigrations of the feminine insofar as it has 
traditionally been aligned with the sensual, the particular, and the temporary as 
against the intellectual, the universal, and the eternal.49 In Adorno and 
Horkheimer’s analysis of the Circe myth, “the powerful seductress is at the same 
time weak, obsolete, and vulnerable” – and must remain so in order for rational 
man’s domination of nature to be secured.50 As Robyn Marasco has argued, 
Adorno and Horkheimer’s analysis shows that the vilification of sex is the 
deprecation of “the only power formally granted to woman, rendering obsolete 
the power of female seduction and forcing upon her a new imperative: submit to 
civilization or remain outside of it.” Moreover, because Odysseus’s marriage to 
Penelope signals the completion of male domination over both women and the 
passions, “Circe’s story stands as the point of transition, not from a feminine order 
to one of masculinist domination, but from the mythic power of sexuality to the 
triumph of sublimated rationality.”51 The “sublimated rationality” idealized by 
classical, Renaissance, and modern writers requires the demonization of the 
femininity, queerness, and animality that it seeks to transcend – or, failing 
transcendence, to destroy in the name of defending virtue. Comus challenges such 
a hierarchy not just in his attractiveness but, more importantly, in his insistent 
challenge to the logic of heteronormativity. For Milton’s Mask ultimately shows 






The debate between the Lady and Comus that is the centerpiece of A 
Mask disturbs the valuation of chastity that critics have let pass without comment 
and that continues to shape the biopolitical scripts through which Milton’s work 
has been understood. The standard historical narrative is that companionate 
marriage constitutes a via media between two sexual options that mainstream 
Protestant Reformers discouraged: lifelong celibacy, on the one hand, and 
promiscuity, on the other. Indeed, as we have seen, Luther collapsed celibacy and 
promiscuity as two sides of the same coin, deeming the inevitably failed aspiration 
to virginity as the cause of “fornication, adultery, and secret sins.” In the debate 
between Comus and the Lady, promiscuity is instead set off against both marriage 
and virginity. In response to the Lady’s distinction between Comus’s “lickerish 
baits fit to ensnare a brute” and “a draught for Juno when she banquets,” a line 
that Leonard has convincingly argued celebrates marriage, Comus aligns marriage 
with virginity.52 Both, he argues, attempt to deny the abjection of our creaturely 
desires and to project onto them a stable and coherent meaning. The result is that 
chastity, whether permanent or temporary, appears not as the recognition of our 
limitations but as a delusional attempt to escape uncertainty:  
List Lady, be not coy, and be not cozen’d  
With that same vaunted name Virginity;  
Beauty is nature’s coin, must not be hoarded,  
But must be current, and the good thereof  
Consists in mutual and partak’n bliss,  
Unsavory in th’enjoyment of itself. (737-742)  
 
The “mutual and partak’n bliss” that Comus recommends would appear to echo 
the Protestant ideal of companionate marriage, but Comus is careful to distinguish 
the lifestyle he has in mind from that initiated by “Juno when she banquets.” His 
description of beauty – and the youth and pleasure it metonymically evokes – as 
currency embraces rather than denies the radical instability of bodily life. Like a 
coin, beauty has no intrinsic value or significance. The promiscuous circulation 
that Comus recommends threatens the clear structures of identity and stability for 
which both virginity and marriage strive. Whereas these forms of chastity remove 
us from circulation, and have clear definitions, promiscuity is defiantly erratic. In 
refusing to pretend that sex within some relations is inherently different from that 
within others, Comus admits and embraces the abjection of all human activity. 
Comus’s earlier threat to make the Lady like “Root-bound” Daphne in this sense 
only literalizes the choice that in his view she is already making, that of stasis. As 
critics have observed, this predicament is an epitome of the earthly existence that 
the Spirit and the Elder Brother imagine as that of virtue: one in which we defer, 
or at least justify, carnal pleasure in the name of a future that is, really, only a matter 
of faith.  
The conclusion of the debate between Comus and the Lady affirms that 
the reproductive futurism that A Mask espouses relies not on facts, logic, or 
evidence, but on an invocation of “some superior power” (800). Milton’s Christian 







ultimately substitutes divine rapture for human reason. What is surprising, 
however, is the absence of critical commentary on the significance of this 
substitution. For what the nonresolution of the debate demonstrates is that the 
ideology that A Mask celebrates is no more logical than the alternative view 
offered by Comus. The Lady does not emerge the clear winner of the argument. 
In fact, she cuts off the debate, charging in frustration that “thou art not fit to hear 
thyself convinc’t” (792). She charges that Comus behaves as he does because he 
is what he is: precisely the sort of Cartesian bête-machine whose automatic, mindless 
response to the material world renders it inferior to those guided by reason and 
reflection. Remarkably, however, the Lady appeals not to the reason that is 
traditionally treated as the mark of humanity, but to something that sounds a lot 
like the irrational ecstasy that Comus endorses. Queer theory’s critique of 
normative ideology allows us to see that the contest is not between human 
rationality and self-consciousness, on the one hand, and bestial sense and 
abjection, on the other. Rather, it is between two different perspectives on the 
proper response to the bodily needs and desires, not to mention the intellectual 
limitations, that thwart humanity’s attempts fully to transcend animal existence. 
The Lady, notably, claims no agency or reason for herself – or anyone else. She 
warns, rather, that the “uncontrolled worth of this pure cause” will  
. . . kindle my rapt spirits 
To such a flame of sacred vehemence, 
That dumb things would be mov’d to sympathize, 
And the brute Earth would lend her nerves, and shake,  
Till all thy magic structures rear’d so high, 
Were shatter’d into heaps o’er thy false head. (792-799)  
 
In the Lady’s final words, “sacred vehemence” replaces secular reason. “[D]umb 
things” will be “mov’d to sympathize,” and the passive construction of the 
sentence registers the passionate nature of this response. These “dumb things” 
may sympathize with the Lady, but they cannot articulate the reasons for their 
agreement. Similarly, the “brute Earth” will respond in the only way an irrational 
thing can: with brute force that destroys rather than persuades that which threatens 
it.  
Comus may allow that the Lady’s words are “set off by some superior 
power,” but he refers not to the power of reason but the threat of physical 
violence, comparing his shaky and sweating reaction to that of “Saturn’s crew” 
when “the wrath of Jove / Speaks thunder and the chains of Erebus” (800, 803, 801-
802). He not persuaded by what he continues to characterize as “mere moral 
babble,” and he resolves to “dissemble” his fear and “try her yet more strongly” 
(807, 805, 806). This is not, of course, to claim that Comus relies only on suasive 
reason. He tricks the Lady into following him, holds her against her will, and 
threatens her with physical and sexual violence, and as many feminists have 
pointed out, the sexual liberation he preaches may sustain masculine sexual 
privilege.53 Rather, I want to point out that a feminist celebration of female chastity 






to deny women sexual agency and to deny sexual minorities rights. Read in terms 
of ongoing debates between feminist and queer scholars, the exchange between 
Comus and the Lady reveals the limits of both a celebration of all sex as liberatory 
and a condemnation of all sex as disempowering.54 Comus and the Lady have both 
resorted to physical force or its threat. Comus seems to recognize, as the Lady 
does not, that his victory will count only if he can persuade the Lady – for surely 
he could physically overcome her if that was what he really wanted. As Kathleen 
Wall has argued, “Comus does not want to rape [the Lady], he wants to initiate 
her.”55 The Lady’s drinking, and the sexual initiation it signifies, will have a 
transformative effect only if she is the agent, however coerced her action may be. 
And while Comus certainly appeals to the same passions that the Lady evokes, 
promising “delight / Beyond the bliss of dreams,” he also asserts the wisdom of 
accepting these passions. His final words, after all, are “Be wise, and taste.” The 
two parts of this exhortation need not be seen as contradicting one another. 
Rather, Comus’s conjunction of wisdom and taste challenges a Christian 
Neoplatonic framework by defining the acceptance of bodily appetites as a rational 
and judicious choice.  
This helps explain why after the Lady is released, the Spirit urges that they 
“fly this cursed place, / Lest the Sorcerer us entice / With some other new device” 
(939-941, my emphasis). For, as we saw earlier, the Lady herself was attracted to 
“the sound / Of Riot and ill- manag’d Merriment” (171-172). Even as she insists 
that she “should be loath / To meet the rudeness and swill’d insolence / Of such 
late Wassailers” she heads right to the spot “Whence ev’n now the tumult of loud 
Mirth / Was rife and perfect in my list’ning ear” (177-179). And although she 
approaches these wassailers only in order to get help (and I think we should believe 
her on this), their presence does stir up “A thousand fantasies / . . . / of calling 
shapes and beck’ning shadows dire” (205, 207). As the Lady’s subsequent lines 
make clear, these “calling shapes and beck’ning shadows dire” are also allegories 
of her own desires. The syntax of the clause, which defers the adjective “dire” until 
the end, suggests that the fear or foreboding aroused by these fantasies comes only 
as an afterthought to their alluring summons. As Shullenberger has beautifully put 
it, “the wood is the place where reason must come to terms with all that it is not, 
where the human discovers itself as an indeterminate question rather than a 
complacent assumption, where one meets oneself in forms one isn’t prepared to 
recognize.”56 The Lady is, as critics have argued, rightfully furious at being held 
hostage. But her threats of violence also suggest the limits of the rationality for 
which she should stand, and therefore make her more like Comus than most critics 
have noticed.57  
The Spirit’s epilogue admits the inadequacy of the vision of A Mask on 
purely rational grounds. These closing lines assert instead the contradiction at the 
heart of the view that normal and perverse sex, along with the definitions of 
humanity and bestiality they sustain, are grounded on a contrast between 
rationality and irrationality, reflection and instinct. For this distinction ultimately 
cannot be upheld on the grounds of rationality and reflection alone. Rather, as the 
Lady, the Elder Brother, and the Spirit admit, and as Sabrina’s necessary 







requires a supplementary appeal to a higher power. The final words of A Mask, 
like the Lady’s final threat to Comus, accept that the virtue it has been celebrating 
is, ultimately, not available through human choice alone but requires divine 
intervention that may collapse rescue and retribution:  
Mortals that would follow me,  
Love virtue, she alone is free,  
She can teach ye how to climb  
Higher than the Sphery chime;  
Or if Virtue feeble were, 
Heav’n itself would stoop to her. (1018-1023)  
 
Initially, the Spirit promises that virtue “alone is free,” subject only to its own 
dictates, not external influence or force. But then he admits that virtue could turn 
out to be “feeble,” too weak to stand on its own, so not quite “free.” In this case, 
he assures us “Heav’n itself would stoop to her.” Divided by that distinctly 
Miltonic “or,” the Spirit’s two definitions of virtue concede the limits of human 
rationality fully to defend the ideals it constructs without recourse to something 
beyond itself. And with that concession – one that Milton could not avoid, given 
his particular theological convictions – A Mask allows for a theory of sex that can 
rightly be called “queer” insofar as it undoes the clear distinctions between reason 
and passion, human and beast, and thereby opens a space within which we might 
question the biopolitical projects that such distinctions both naturalize and sustain.  
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